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This paper examines the participation of the European Union (EU) in the multilateral 
negotiations of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Given the EU’s declared commitment 
to effective multilateralism and dedication to act as a global security provider, the 
paper analyses to what extent the EU can be seen as an effective actor in 
supporting and promoting the ATT. It is argued that overall the EU was an effective 
player during the multilateral negotiations on the ATT, but the degree of its 
effectiveness varied along different dimensions. The EU was relatively successful in 
the achievement of its goals and in maintaining external cohesion during the 
negotiations, but it scored relatively low in its efforts to commit other major players to 
sign up to the ATT. The high level of institutional cooperation and the convergence of 
EU member states’ interests facilitated the EU’s effectiveness in the ATT negotiations, 





Introduction: The EU as an Effective Global Security Actor 
 
On 2 April 2013 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a 
new multilateral agreement in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation – the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The new accord became the first 
global instrument to regulate international trade in conventional arms. Several 
regional mechanisms, among which the most renowned is the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, have already been in place to address the issue of arms export 
control. Yet, in contrast to the ATT, these regimes lack a legally binding nature 
and are not universal in their membership. Moreover, conventional arms, until 
recently, have been the only type of arms not covered by global multilateral 
treaties as has been the case with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons for 
quite some time already. As the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued in the 
run-up to the UNGA, “there are common standards for the global trade in 
armchairs but not the global trade in arms”. 1  Given the size of the global 
conventional arms market2 and the impact of uncontrolled and illicit arms flows 
on the spread of international conflicts and violence, the significance of the new 
ATT for international security should not be underestimated. 
The European Union (EU) has emerged in recent decades as a new actor 
on the international scene and a provider of international peace, security and 
stability. 3  During the last two decades it has managed to develop multiple 
security policies, institutional structures and instruments under the umbrella of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CFSP/CSDP). The EU has become a player in the fields of conflict management, 
peace building, counter-terrorism, as well as non-proliferation and arms control. In 
particular, through the European Security Strategy, the EU has pledged to address 
threats of arms proliferation through a multilateral approach to security vowing its 
                                                 
1 B. Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s remarks to Final United Nations Conference on the 
Arms Trade Treaty”, New York, 18 March 2013. 
2 According to the UN, the international arms trade market is estimated to have a value of 
USD 70 billion. This number roughly equals the GDP of hydrocarbon-rich economy of 
Azerbaijan. 
3 S. Biscop & R. Whitman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of European Security, London, 
Routledge, 2013; C. Kaunert & K. Zwolski, The EU as a Global Security Actor: A 
Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; C. 
Hill & M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011; K. Engelbrekt & J. Hallenberg (eds.), The European Union and 
Strategy: An Emerging Actor, London, Routledge, 2008. 
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support to international arms control treaties and agreements. 4 The question, 
therefore, arises about the EU’s role in promoting and supporting the ATT regime, 
given its salience and significance for international security on the one hand, and 
the EU’s commitment to strengthen the multilateral security order on the other. 
 The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the EU’s involvement in the ATT 
preparations. It explores to what extent the EU can be seen as an effective actor 
in supporting and promoting the Arms Trade Treaty. First, the paper examines not 
only the EU’s capacity to be an actor in a specific multilateral forum, but takes a 
step further by addressing the outcomes and results of the EU’s actual 
performance during the ATT negotiations. It will be argued that although the EU 
has largely managed to secure a favourable outcome of the ATT negotiations, 
the degree of its effectiveness varies across different dimensions. Essentially, it will 
be shown that despite demonstrating the capacity of an effective actor, the EU 
did not play a leadership role in the ATT process. Second, in addition to 
аdvancіng the undеrstanding of the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral security 
governance, the study also seeks to uncover the underlying factors which 
arguably shape the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral fora. Three potentially 
important factors – institutional coordination, the convergence of member states’ 
interests and the international context – are singled out and will be presented in 
greater detail below.5 
The paper is organised as follows. First, I will briefly outline the history of the 
ATT and the driving forces pushing the EU to engage. Second, I will turn to the EU’s 
and the member states’ positions and behaviour during the ATT process with a 
particular emphasis on two UN conferences held in July 2012 and March 2013. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the legal and political international context, 
including the positions of emerging powers – Russia, China and India – during the 
ATT negotiations. The following section will present an empirical analysis of the 
EU’s effectiveness in the ATT process according to three dimensions – 
achievement of goals, recognition of relevance and external cohesion. The 
concluding section will summarise the findings of the paper and will outline some 
policy implications. 
                                                 
4 Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy”, 15895/03, Brussels, 8 December 2003. 
5 For more information on the choice of causal factors see I. Romanyshyn, The EU and the 
Arms Trade Treaty: A Study of the EU's Effectiveness in Multilateral Security Governance, 




The EU and the Arms Trade Treaty 
 
International efforts to put the global arms sales under control have a rich 
history dating back to the inter-war time period of the League of Nations.6 After 
the end of the Cold War several Nobel Peace Laureates elaborated the 
International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, which called upon the states 
“to adhere to their commitments on international human rights and humanitarian 
law when considering application for export licenses”.7 After this initiative was put 
on the table at the UN in the late 1990s, civil society organisations started an 
intense lobbying campaign pushing for a legally binding treaty on conventional 
arms transfers based on suggestions of the Nobel Peace Laureates. The process 
reached a momentum when one of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (SC) – the United Kingdom – declared its support for the initiative.  
In March 2005, the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put forward a 
roadmap consisting of six points which should have become the main principles 
of the new ATT.8 By the end of 2006, governments of seven states9 circulated the 
draft resolution “Towards the Arms Trade Treaty” which was adopted with a large 
majority by the UNGA in December as Resolution 61/89. This Resolution called for 
“a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”.10 The EU 
declared its immediate support for the new Treaty and for the UN as the most 
appropriate forum for its elaboration. Furthermore, the Council also “expressed 
the belief that the European Union should play an active role in this process, 
together with like-minded states and regional organisations from different parts of 
the world”.11 
                                                 
6 M. Bromley, N. Cooper & P. Holtom, “The UN Arms Trade Treaty: arms export controls, the 
human security agenda and the lessons of history”, International Affairs, vol. 88, no. 5, 
2012, pp. 1029-1048. 
7  P. Holtom & S. Wezeman, “Appendix 10C. Towards an Arms Trade Treaty?”, SIPRI 
Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, p. 433. 
8 J. Straw, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, “Securing a global arms trade treaty”, 
speech, Institute of Civil Engineers, London, 15 March 2005. 
9 Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the UK were original co-
sponsors of the ATT. 
10 United Nations, General Assembly, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/61/89, New York, 18 December 2006, 
p. 2. 
11 Council of the European Union, “2678th General Affairs and External Relations Council 
Meeting”, Press Release, 12514/05, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, p. 15. 
BRIGG Paper 3/2013 
 7 
Why was it important for the EU to play an active role in the ATT process? 
First, although the EU as such does not export arms, the EU member states 
collectively accounted for one third of global arms exports between 2006 and 
2010. 12  Given the volume of the arms trade and the high economic stakes 
attached to it, it was essential for the EU member states to be active participants 
in the negotiations. Second, the emerging ATT regime could have opened the 
opportunity for the EU to promote its internal model of export control based on 
strict criteria, including those related to the humanitarian agenda. In addition, 
projection of the EU’s internal policy standards at the international level could 
help to streamline the EU’s and the UN’s arms embargo policies. Third, by 
endorsing the ATT as a UN treaty, the EU could contribute to strengthening the 
multilateral order, which is the principal objective of EU foreign policy.13 This is 
particularly important in the area of conventional arms, as the most recent 
multilateral treaties in this field – the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions – were adopted outside the UN framework. 
The EU’s Objectives and Instruments 
The EU followed the ATT process from its very inception and the Council 
adopted its first Conclusions on the ATT on 3 October 2005.14 Following the request 
of Resolution 61/89 for the governments to submit their views on the main points of 
the future Treaty, all the 27 EU member states and the EU responded. At this initial 
stage, the EU did not formulate explicit demands, but drew attention to the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports15 and the EU Military List as ‘best examples’ for 
the scope and parameters of the ATT. 16 In addition, in order to address the 
skeptical countries, like the USA, India, China and Russia, which questioned the 
rationale and feasibility of the new Treaty, the EU stated that its own experience 
                                                 
12 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed 1 May 2013, http://www.sipri.org/ 
databases/armstransfers 
13 R. Gowan, “The European Security Strategy’s global objective: effective multilateralism”, 
in S. Biscop & J. Andersson, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global 
Europe, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 42-61. 
14 Council of the European Union, “2678th General Affairs and External Relations Council 
Meeting”, op.cit. 
15  An intergovernmental instrument, which encourages member states to assess their 
export authorisations to third countries against eight specific criteria ranging from respect 
for international law to sustainable development. See Council of the European Union, 
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 8675/2/98, Brussels, 5 June 1998. In 
2008 the Code of Conduct was transformed into a legally binding EU Common Position.  
16 United Nations, General Assembly, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”, Report 




with export control policy “demonstrates the feasibility of agreeing on an 
instrument without depriving States of their national prerogative to license or deny 
individual exports, and confirms the effectiveness and efficiency of multilateral 
export control”.17 
 The EU has become a regular attendant and participant of the Open-
ended Working Group (OEWG), which was created by the subsequent UNGA 
Resolution in December 2008 with a mandate for further elaboration on the 
parameters of the Treaty.18 The OEWG was later transformed into the Preparatory 
Committee which, during its four meetings in 2010 and 2011, discussed the 
procedural and substantial details in the run-up to the UN conference on the ATT 
scheduled for July 2012. During the negotiations in the OEWG and in the 
Preparatory Committee it became clear that the most contentious issues that 
would need to be reconciled related to the criteria for export control, the scope 
of the Treaty in terms of the weapons list and activities, implementation 
mechanisms and transparency provisions.19 
 The EU pursued two overarching objectives in the ATT negotiations. First, it 
was convinced that in order to have an added value for and a positive impact 
on global security the Treaty had to be “as strong as possible”.20 By adopting a 
maximalist approach to the emerging arms trade regime, the EU took a 
progressive stance on each of the controversial items. For example, with regard 
to the export control criteria, the EU wanted to make sure that the decision on the 
arms transfers would be weighed against the risk of human rights abuses, gender-
based violence and violation of international humanitarian law in the country of 
destination. Mirroring its own criteria in the EU Code of Conduct, the EU further 
maintained that the criteria for arms transfer authorisation should reflect the risk to 
regional security and stability, the risk of diversion to unintended users, and the 
                                                 
17 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on a legally binding international 
Arms Trade Treaty”, 2839th General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 10 December 2007, 
p. 1. 
18 United Nations, General Assembly, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/63/240, New York, 24 December 
2008. 
19 Detailed information on the proceedings and discussions in the OEWG and Preparatory 
Committee as well as participants’ statements are available at http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/ATT/statements/ 
20 Interview with an official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 4 April 2013. 
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impact on sustainable development. Moreover, the EU suggested including a 
reference to the risk of corruption in the ATT.21 
Concerning the scope of the Treaty, the EU maintained that, in addition to 
existing types of arms enlisted in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, it should 
incorporate small arms and light weapons, ammunition and technology transfers. 
In terms of activities, according to Brussels, the Treaty should not be limited to 
exports and imports only, but needed to include a broader set, such as transit, 
transshipment and brokering. 22  Further, the EU suggested an implementation 
mechanism with the creation of an international secretariat and regular review 
conferences; a transparency scheme with public reporting on the arms sales, as 
well as an information exchange between states.23 Finally, the EU pledged to 
pursue the inclusion of a regional integration organisation (RIO) clause, which 
would allow the EU and other regional organisations to become formal parties to 
the Treaty. These objectives were intended to increase the Treaty’s positive 
impact on global security and were meant to be achieved largely by the 
instruments of multilateral diplomacy during the ATT negotiations. 
 The second overarching goal of the EU for the ATT was to ensure that the 
agreement was “as inclusive as possible”.24 If in the case of the previous objective 
multilateralism was perceived as an instrument to achieve greater security, here it 
was treated rather as a goal, since the EU wanted to ensure that a high number 
of states supports, signs and ratifies the Treaty. This task required the EU to apply a 
wider set of instruments beyond bargaining in a multilateral forum.  
First, the EU tried to address skeptical countries through bilateral diplomatic 
channels. The ATT issue, for example, was regularly raised each year at working 
level with the US, Russia and China. The topic was addressed around 15 times with 
each of these countries by the High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, in the period between 2009 
                                                 
21 European Union, “Statement on behalf of the European Union by Mr. Attila Zimonyi at 
the Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on 
the Arms Trade Treaty: Parameters of an Arms Trade Treaty”, New York, 1 March 2011. 
22  European Union, “Statement by Mr. Werner Bauwens at the First session of the 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty: 
Scope of the ATT”, New York, 15 July 2010. 
23 European Union, “Statement on behalf of the European Union by Ms. Annalisa Giannella 
at the Preparatory Committee for the Arms Trade Treaty on transparency provisions and 
Implementation Support Unit of the Arms Trade Treaty”, New York, 12 July 2011. 
24 Council of the European Union, “Draft Council Conclusions on the Arms Trade Treaty”, 




and 2012.25 Second, the EU also put a considerable amount of financial resources 
on the table. The Council adopted two CFSP acts in support of the ATT with more 
than EUR 2.3 million of financial assistance.26 These funds were used to organise 13 
regional seminars in Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East and Europe with 
local policy-makers and the public. The seminars aimed at raising awareness 
about export control mechanisms and, from time to time, served as fora for pre-
negotiations. 27 Third, the EU strengthened its coalition with a number of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), in particular with Saferworld and Amnesty 
International, through developing common projects and supporting their 
participation in the UN conference.28 Closer ties with NGOs allowed the EU to 
contribute to grassroots mobilisation and a wider public debate on the Treaty. The 
EU’s two overarching goals of a strong and universal ATT were pursued in parallel, 
but, as shown above, required somewhat different instruments to be achieved. 
The EU’s Institutional Coordination 
The central role in coordinating the EU’s negotiating position in the ATT 
deliberations belonged to the Council, in particular to its working group on 
conventional arms (COARM). COARM consists of member state officials from 
national capitals and, at the time when the ATT process began, it was chaired by 
the rotating Presidency of the EU with assistance from the Council Secretariat. The 
coordination process started in 2008, when the OEWG was created and EU 
officials started to engage in its work. Since 2009 a special group, the COARM-
CODUN,29 was set up, merging the expertise on conventional arms export control 
with disarmament processes at the UN level. The COARM-CODUN ATT group was 
given the task to develop strategic and tactical positions on different ATT 
provisions and to elaborate on projects in the form of outreach seminars that 
were put in place by the Council Decision in 2009.30 Since 2011, the group was 
                                                 
25 Interview with an official, European External Action Service, via telephone, 26 April 2013. 
26 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2009/42/CFSP of 19 January 2009 on 
support for EU activities in order to promote among third countries the process leading 
towards an Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy”, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 17/39, 22 January 2009; Council of the European 
Union, “Council Decision 2010/336/CFSP of 14 June 2010 on EU activities in support of the 
Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 152/14, 18 June 2010. 
27 Interview with an official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 4 April 2013. 
28 European Union, “EU opening statement at the Preparatory Committee of the Arms 
Trade Treaty”, New York, 13 February 2012. 
29 CODUN stands for Global Disarmament and Arms Control working group. 
30 Interview with an official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 4 April 2013. 
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meeting on a monthly basis to prepare for different stages of the negotiation 
process. In addition to these intense coordination meetings, the COARM-CODUN 
drafted an EU non-paper on the ATT, a confidential document which contains the 
EU’s position on different aspects of the ATT. The document formed the basis for 
exchanges between the member states in the run-up to the UN conference in 
July 2012 and proved to be a useful consensus-building exercise.31 
What is important to highlight here is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
process of internal coordination. The role of the rotating Presidency in the area of 
CFSP was largely replaced by the European External Action Service (EEAS) which 
was established in December 2010. Both the COARM and CODUN working parties 
were integrated into the EEAS and thus are no longer chaired by the rotating 
Presidency’s representative, but by an EEAS official. A permanent chair helped to 
ensure not only consistency and better expertise, but also enhanced a sense of 
impartiality. According to one official, the new status of the working groups 
reinforced their agenda-setting power and also allowed them to gain a certain 
level of trust from the member states.32 This, in the end, also positively impacted 
on the internal coordination on the ATT.  
The European Commission’s role in the ATT coordination was also 
significant, albeit overshadowed by its competence dispute with the member 
states. The need for the Commission’s presence was justified by a necessity to 
guarantee that the ATT was compatible with the EU acquis. In other words, it was 
important to ensure that new controls imposed by the ATT would not disrupt the 
functioning of the EU’s internal trade in defence-related products.33 Although the 
Commission normally participates in the deliberations of the Council working 
groups, which implies that it was aware of the ATT dossier, it signaled its wish to be 
part of the multilateral negotiations only months before the July 2012 UN 
conference. Consequently, the Commission fell short of the time needed for 
proper preparations and exceptionally asked the Council to authorise the 
member states to negotiate certain parts of the Treaty covered by the Union’s 
exclusive competence. Yet, for the March 2013 UN conference, the Commission 
sought a different mandate that authorised itself to negotiate the relevant 
aspects of the ATT and entered into a discussion with the member states. This 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 





naturally created confusion and caused frustration with some of the Council 
members. Nevertheless, the inter-institutional dispute did not affect the EU’s 
external representation as the EEAS diplomats continued to speak on behalf of 
the EU as a whole.34 
 Finally, despite its limited role in the area of arms control and disarmament, 
the European Parliament also raised its voice concerning the ATT. In its Resolution 
of 13 June 2012, the European Parliament reiterated its support for a global, 
legally binding Treaty and for the Council Conclusions on this topic.35 Moreover, 
the European Parliament recognised “the coherent and consistent role played by 
the EU and its Member States in support of the international process to establish 
an arms trade treaty”.36 Despite the spat over the legal competences between 
the Commission and the Council, the level of the EU’s internal coordination on the 
ATT can still be evaluated as above average. 
EU Member States’ National Preferences 
On the level of the 27 EU member states there was a high degree of 
convergence of national preferences concerning the ATT. Member states 
reiterated the EU’s view on the need of a strong and universal agreement 
regulating arms sales. There was also a consensus on how the key parameters of 
the future Treaty should look like. In their response to the UN Secretary-General’s 
call on expressing preliminary views on the ATT, EU member states shared a 
common vision on the necessity to include strict criteria for export risk 
assessment.37 In fact, most of them referred to the norms that were already in 
place at the European and domestic levels, such as those regarding the human 
security agenda. Furthermore, member states maintained similar views on the 
scope of the Treaty, the implementation mechanisms and transparency 
provisions. 
One of the reasons why the new agreement was relatively uncontroversial 
among EU member states is the fact that the ATT, like the EU Code of Conduct, 
                                                 
34  Interview with an official, EU Delegation to the United Nations in New York, via 
telephone, 8 April 2013. 
35 European Parliament, Resolution of 13 June 2012 on the negotiations on the UN Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT), (2012/2636(RSP)), Strasbourg, 13 June 2012. 
36 Ibid. 
37 United Nations, General Assembly, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”, Report 
of the Secretary-General, A/62/278 Parts I and II, 17 August 2007. 
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leaves the implementation and enforcement of the export control policy fully to 
the member states. As long as protection of national sovereignty is ensured, 
governments are ready to compromise on the rest of the issues. Moreover, the ATT 
could create a level playing field for national defence industries on a global 
scale. As stated by German officials, “export control can only achieve maximum 
effectiveness if as many countries as possible apply similar rules and 
procedures”.38 Finally, the ATT provisions endorsed the creation of structures and 
practices which to a great extent were already institutionalised at the domestic 
level in European countries. Apart from export criteria, this relates among others, 
to the establishment of appropriate national authorisation bodies, end-use 
control and lists of controlled military items. 
 Certainly, there were some initial disagreements pertaining to national 
peculiarities. Italy, for instance, wanted to keep civilian arms out of the scope of 
the Treaty. 39  Germany was targeting a more ambitious export control risk 
assessment than the one suggested by EU diplomats.40 Yet, these differences 
were of minor significance in comparison to the common objective of a strong 
and effective global agreement. Member states’ consensus around the ATT was 
further reinforced by a joint declaration of the EU’s top arms exporting countries. 
In their joint statement, the Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK explained their view on different points of the Treaty and declared their 
wish “to conclude a strong, robust, effective and legally binding Arms Trade 
Treaty in order to make the world a safer place and reduce the number of 
innocent victims of armed violence”. 41 Looking beyond the ATT case, it was 
confirmed that, as such, arms export control in Europe “is an issue, where, 
compared to other areas of non-proliferation and disarmament, there has been 
considerable level of cohesion among member states in terms of policy 
objectives”.42 
                                                 
38 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Report by the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Export of Conventional Military Equipment in 
2010, Berlin, BMWi, p. 16. 
39 S. Depauw, “The European Union’s involvement in negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty”, 
Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 23, December 2012, p. 5. 
40 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, op.cit., p. 9. 
41 L. Fabius et al., “A strong Arms Trade Treaty for a safer world: let’s finish our work”, Joint 
Communiqué by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the Minister for Trade of Sweden, 26 September 2012. 




 After the discussion of the EU's stance on the ATT, inter-institutional 
coordination and member states’ preferences, the paper turns to the assessment 
of the international context of the ATT negotiations as an important factor 
shaping the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral security governance. 
 
The International Context and the Arms Trade Treaty 
 
 The following paragraphs scrutinize the legal circumstances of the EU’s 
status and participation in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Further, 
they examine the geopolitical context of the ATT negotiations focusing on the 
positions of emerging powers – Russia, India and China – on particular instances 
of the ATT. 
The Legal Context: UN General Assembly and Security Council 
The ATT was elaborated under the premises of the First Committee of the 
UNGA, which deals with the issues of disarmament and international security, and 
subsequently adopted by vote in the General Assembly. At the moment the ATT 
initiative was put on the table in the mid-2000s, the EU enjoyed a formal observer 
status at the UN. Due to a lack of legal personality, it was recognised in the UN as 
the European Community represented by the European Commission (in cases of 
exclusive competence) and the rotating Presidency (in cases of shared 
competences and the CFSP).43 The observer status allowed the EU representatives 
to participate only in formal meetings without the right to propose amendments 
or to chair the meetings.44 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
situation has changed. Having acquired legal personality, the EU pushed to 
upgrade its formal status in the UNGA and related multilateral fora. As a result, the 
UN Resolution 65/276 of 3 May 2011 granted the EU an ‘enhanced observer’ 
                                                 
43  M. Farrell, “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations”, in K. 
Laatikainen & K. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting 
Multilateralisms, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 31. 
44 F. Hoffmeister & P. Kuijper, “The Status of the European Union at the United Nations: 
Institutional Ambiguities and Political Realities”, in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister & Tom 
Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, p. 14. 
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status.45 The EU obtained the right to attend informal meetings, the right to speak 
and to make interventions, as well as the ability to propose amendments. 46 
However, the EU still has no voting rights in the UN. Moreover, its amendments 
may be put on vote only at the initiative of an EU member state. Given these 
shortcomings, scholars concluded that even though the EU’s status and visibility in 
the UN were upgraded, it will most likely remain “procedurally handicapped”, as 
it “still has to rely on its member states to promote its agenda in the UNGA”.47 
 In the SC the EU is virtually absent and the primary actors in this forum are 
EU member states. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty has made an attempt to 
enhance the EU’s presence in the SC. Article 34 TEU calls upon those EU member 
states, which hold a seat in the SC to “concert and keep the other Member 
States and the High Representative fully informed [and] defend the positions and 
the interests of the Union”.48 Member states can even request the SC to give 
permission to the EU High Representative to speak at the forum on behalf of the 
EU. In practice, however, member states, in particular France and the UK, show 
little willingness to act as ‘agents of Europe’ in the SC prioritising their national 
positions over an EU collective action.49 
The Geopolitical Context: Emerging Powers 
The rise of emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, China, India, South 
Africa and Indonesia, became a widely recognised indicator of the shifting 
international order. Amongst these states, three – Russia, China and India – are 
the leading players in the field of arms sales. Currently, Russia is the second largest 
exporter of arms after the US, while India and China lead in the ranking of the 
world’s largest arms importers (the first and second, respectively).50 Moreover, in 
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2012, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, China entered the ‘top 5’ list 
of the largest arms exporters crowding out the UK.51 Russia, China and India were 
among the 23 countries that abstained during the vote in the UN GA on the ATT 
on 2 April 2013. 
Russia 
Accounting for a quarter of global arms exports, Russia entered the 
negotiations with high economic stakes. A global agreement on arms trade was 
perceived as the one which could impose new restrictions on Russian global arms 
trade. This is especially true when it comes to Russia’s arms sales to Syria – one of 
the biggest markets for Russian defence industry and a strategic political foothold 
in the Mediterranean.52 Thus, Russia initially took quite a resistant stand on the 
Treaty, questioning its feasibility “without jeopardizing legal trade and the right of 
States to self-defence”53. 
The Russian position on the substance of the ATT was characterised by 
several important arguments. First, Moscow favoured a restricted view on the 
scope of the ATT. It maintained that the arms trade can be best accommodated 
as a state-to-state activity, setting aside non-governmental actors’ 
participation. 54  Second, given its restricted focus on state security, it is not 
surprising that Russian officials were not very keen on supporting those parts of the 
ATT related to the principles of human security and good governance. As it was 
argued by one expert, “the concept of human security is virtually absent from 
Russian security doctrine and discourse”.55 
 Russian diplomats also highlighted several shortcomings of the ATT. 
According to their view, the humanitarian criteria of export control were not 
adequately clarified leaving a wide room for misinterpretation. Further, the Treaty 
was criticised for not maintaining a ban on arms transfer to non-state entities, 
such as terrorist groups. In addition, some criticism was addressed to provisions on 
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diversion, which, in the Russian opinion, could have been stronger.56 In general, 
even though the Russian position became more constructive towards the end of 
the negotiations, Moscow still remained skeptical about the ATT, and it is unlikely 
that Russia will decide to sign and ratify the Treaty in the short term.   
China 
China is certainly ‘rising’ in the field of arms exports – as of 2012 it became 
the first non-Western country since several decades to be included into the ‘top 
5’ world arms traders. During the last decade, the volume of Chinese exports rose 
by 162 per cent, though, in relative terms China’s global market share today 
constitutes only 5 per cent.57 Although China does not extract as many economic 
benefits as Russia from the arms sales, they are strategically important for Beijing. It 
exports more than half of its weapons to Pakistan, strengthening political ties 
between the two countries and following the common interest in containing 
India. 
 Similarly to Russia, China was not enthusiastic about the idea of a global 
multilateral instrument to regulate arms trade. It has taken both a restrictive and a 
resistant position vis-à-vis the ATT. First, China believed that the main objective of 
the ATT should be to prevent and combat illicit arms trade, rather than regulate 
legal arms transfers, as the latter could impose restrictions on developing 
domestic defence capabilities. Chinese diplomats, for example, put a particular 
effort to keep the loans and gifts out of the Treaty’s scope.58 Second, Chinese 
diplomats also emphasised the principles of sovereignty and of non-interference: 
“The treaty shall not be misused for political purposes to interfere with the normal 
arms trade and internal affairs of any state”.59 Indeed, China did not particularly 
welcome the inclusion of humanitarian criteria into the Treaty. In the past, China 
had sided several times with Russia against European countries in refusing to 
impose UN arms embargoes on Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe and, most recently, 
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Syria.60 The Chinese delegation abstained during the final vote on the ATT and it 
remains to be seen whether Beijing will eventually put its signature under the 
Treaty.  
India 
As the largest arms importer in the world, India had a high stake in the 
outcome of the ATT negotiations.  India’s share of global arms imports amounts to 
12 per cent, and it is reported that during the period 2008 and 2012 India 
imported double the volume of Chinese arms imports.61 While China appears to 
be the largest supplier of arms to Pakistan, Russia and the UK share the greatest 
part of the Indian arms imports. 
Overall, the tone and attitude of India towards the new multilateral arms 
export control instrument echoed Russian and Chinese positions. The primary 
concern for Indians was the illicit trade and arms transfer to non-state armed 
groups, including terrorists. India thus called for a legal provision in the Treaty 
prohibiting such transfers.62 India also used sovereigntist rhetoric emphasising the 
legitimate right of states to engage in arms trade and self-defence. At the same 
time, India’s position was somewhat different from its BRICS counterparts. As the 
largest arms importer in the world, India assumed responsibility to speak on behalf 
of smaller arms importers when confronting Western exporting states. Resembling 
the discussion in the World Trade Organisation between developing and 
developed countries, Indian diplomats pushed for recognition of importers’ rights: 
“The ATT should not be an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take 
unilateral force majeure measures against importing states without 
consequences”.63 
As the biggest democracy in the world, India was much more supportive 
towards inclusion of the humanitarian agenda in the Treaty, as well as provisions 
which call on states to respect their obligations under international law. On the 
other hand, and contrary to the EU, India was not aiming at the strongest possible 
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version of the Treaty. It pushed for a clause to exclude any bilateral defence 
cooperation agreements from the scope of the ATT and, according to a 
diplomat, maintained a very inflexible position on this point.64 Given the above 
mentioned points of criticism, India has chosen to abstain during the final vote 
and to scrutinise the draft ATT in greater detail before taking a decision on its 
signature. 
Thus, the geopolitical context of the EU’s participation in the ATT 
negotiations proved to be constraining. The most important players in the area of 
arms trade – Russia, China and India – shared somewhat different concerns from 
those of the EU and, to a large extent, pushed in a direction opposite to the EU’s 
objectives. As argued by de Vasconcelos, “China, Russia and India are all 
questionable partners who have a different perspective on multilateralism from 
that of the EU […] they constitute major obstacles to the pursuit of effective 
multilateralism”.65 Taken as a whole, the international context did not provide a 
favourable momentum for reaching the EU’s objectives in the ATT process. 
 
Analysis of the EU’s Effectiveness in the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations 
 
This section performs an empirical analysis of the EU’s effectiveness in the 
ATT negotiations according to three dimensions – achievement of goals, 
recognition of relevance and external cohesion. In addition, it puts forward some 
elements of an explanation of the varying degree of the EU’s effectiveness. 
Achievement of Goals 
The first dimension of the EU’s effectiveness measures the extent to which 
the EU was able to fulfill its declared objectives. The EU pursued two overarching 
goals with regard to the ATT. On the one hand, it sought to ensure the Treaty’s 
contribution to international security. In order to have an added value for 
preventing international conflicts and violence, the new instrument needed to be 
strong and progressive in terms of its substance. On the other hand, the EU was 
also concerned about the form of the agreement. It stressed on many occasions 
that the Treaty should be as universal as possible in its membership in order to 
strengthen multilateral security governance. These two objectives – ‘strong ATT’ 
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and ‘universal ATT’ – are not mutually exclusive and the EU indeed pursued both 
of them in parallel.  
 The EU was largely successful in pursuing the first objective concerning the 
Treaty’s substance. First and foremost, the EU has managed to push for a full 
incorporation of the principles related to the human security agenda. Article 7 of 
the ATT maintains that states should weight their decisions on authorizing arms 
exports to a certain country against the risks of human rights abuses, gender-
based violence and violation of international humanitarian law. Moreover, Article 
6 prohibits any arms sales, if they risk to be used for committing genocide or 
crimes against humanity. Other criteria, such as the respect for international 
obligations, regional peace, stability and the fight against corruption, were also 
included in the Treaty text. The only export criterion which did not find a place in 
Articles 6 or 7, but is reflected in the Preamble of the document, is the principle of 
sustainable development.66 The EU has thus managed to successfully ‘upload’ 
virtually all the principles of its Code of Conduct to the international level. 
The EU has also accomplished its objective regarding the scope of the 
Treaty, albeit less successfully. Small arms, ammunition and weapons’ 
components, apart from technology, were indeed included in the ATT. Yet, 
ammunition was not considered for the import, transit and brokering activities, 
something which the US strongly opposed to. 67  Further, provisions on 
implementation and transparency reflect EU demands. The ATT obliges states to 
put in force appropriate national control systems and report annually to the ATT 
Secretariat. States are also obliged to publish reports on the application of the 
Treaty and maintain an information exchange between them. The only point 
which was not achieved during the negotiations is the possibility for the regional 
organisations to become official parties to the Treaty. The RIO clause was blocked 
by China on the grounds of the EU’s arms embargo to this country.68 The Chinese 
diplomats exploited the RIO clause as a point of diplomatic bargaining in an 
attempt to pressure the EU to remove the 24-year old ban. 
 It seems rather surprising that one of the EU’s principal objectives, the 
inclusion of the RIO clause into the ATT, resulted in failure. One possible 
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explanation for this may be the role which the Commission has played in the inter-
institutional coordination process. Apart from supervising compliance of the ATT 
text with the EU acquis, the Commission was also tasked to be responsible for the 
RIO clause, as its team consisted of officials with, inter alia, legal expertise.69 Yet, 
the Commission started to participate in negotiations only in 2012, thus not 
leaving enough time for a necessary ‘pre-cooking’ of the issue. Indeed, the RIO 
clause appeared for the first time in the EU statements only during the UN 
conference in July 2012, and had no reference whatsoever during the 
Preparatory Committee meetings.70 
Recognition of Relevance 
The second dimension of the EU’s effectiveness in international institutions 
deals with the EU’s ability to gain support from third parties in multilateral fora. This 
aspect of the EU’s effectiveness mirrors in a way the second big objective that the 
EU pursued in the ATT negotiating process: to ensure the highest possible number 
of positive votes on the Treaty. In this respect, the EU viewed the universality of the 
ATT as complementary to its first objective (‘strong ATT’) and a precondition for 
the Treaty’s success. Indeed, it would be mistaken to expect the ATT to make a 
real difference in the field of international security if the most important players 
were not on board. Since the world’s top arms exporter – the USA – has dropped 
its opposition to the ATT after Barack Obama was elected President in 2008, it 
became crucial to ensure support of the other important arms traders, in 
particular Russia, China and India. 
 Yet, as shown above, these states remained skeptical throughout the 
entire negotiation process and eventually have chosen not to vote in favour of 
the ATT in the UNGA plenary session on 2 April 2013. The EU thus was not in an 
authoritative position to convince these states to reverse their positions vis-à-vis 
the ATT and to pledge their commitment to multilateralism in the area of 
international security governance. As the ability of the EU to gain support of third 
players in multilateral negotiations was considered as a key proxy to measure the 
recognition of the EU’s relevance, it may be concluded that the second 
dimension of the EU’s effectiveness scored low during the ATT negotiations. The 
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low recognition of relevance by the third parties in practical terms sheds a light 
on the EU's difficulties to act as a leader in multilateral security fora. 
The study maintains that the international context can best explain the EU’s 
low recognition of relevance in the ATT multilateral negotiations. First, the legal 
context of the EU’s participation in the UNGA proved to be a constraining factor. 
The fact that the EU does not possess voting rights and has to rely on its member 
states in pursuing amendments does not add to the EU’s image of a strong and 
authoritative player. The relevance of the legal framework of the EU’s 
participation was best underlined by one of the interviewees: “The enhanced 
observer status helped to put you in a more comfortable and recognized 
position. But how serious you are taken as a negotiator, is another question. They 
know that you don’t vote, so it doesn’t cost anything to listen to you”.71 
Second, the geopolitical context of a changing international order also 
shaped the attitude of the emerging powers towards the EU. All three – Russia, 
China and India – share a deep resistance to the Western political agenda and 
hold up the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. Russia was 
acutely distrustful to the inclusion of the humanitarian agenda into the scope of 
the ATT and regarded the Treaty as a reflection of a mainly Western view on 
global arms trade. India, although receptive to the human security agenda, 
repeatedly stressed national sovereignty concerns and the right to self-defence 
pushing for an exception to the Treaty’s application. Finally, China quarreled with 
the EU over the bilateral problem of an arms embargo rather than actively 
working out the details of an emerging global arms trade regime. As one observer 
argues, “China clearly sees multilateral bodies as a means of defending its own 
interests. Multilateralism for Beijing is a continuation of realpolitik by other 
means”.72 This instrumentalist view of multilateralism is frequently shared by other 
emerging powers too.  
 On the other hand, the EU itself could have done more in order to 
convince skeptical countries to sign up to the ATT. In particular, the EU could have 
made better use of its strategic partnership frameworks with the emerging states. 
A significant bilateral diplomatic outreach was performed only in relation to 
Russia, with Russian representatives occasionally visiting meetings of the COARM 
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working group, but in the cases of China and India the bilateral dialogue was 
much weaker.73 Further, the EU-sponsored regional seminars on the ATT also did 
not reach the end goal vis-à-vis the emerging powers, but proved to be a useful 
tool for raising awareness on the ATT among smaller states. It should be noted, 
however, that a full judgment on the degree of the recognition of the EU’s 
relevance by emerging powers in the ATT case can only be made after their final 
decision on the signature and ratification of the Treaty. 
External Cohesion 
The third dimension of the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral institutions is 
related to the extent to which the EU and its member state spoke with one voice 
and acted collectively during the final ATT conferences. As in any type of 
multilateral negotiations, collective and coordinated action between EU 
institutions and EU member states is a central issue for the EU, against which the 
level of its effectiveness can be measured. Jørgensen argues that “to the extent 
that the number of voices counts in multilateralism, it might give additional 
strength to the EU if its goals were consistently pursued by many voices”.74 Yet, as 
long as member states sit at the negotiating table, each with its own national 
agenda, the challenge of external cohesion will remain essential for the EU’s 
performance in multilateral institutions.  
 In general, there was a considerable level of external cohesion between 
EU actors during the final UN conferences in 2012 and 2013. Seven EU member 
states took the floor during the opening session of the ATT conference on 18 
March 2013.75 In their statements, all seven countries mentioned as their priority 
the inclusion of the provisions related to humanitarian parameters, ammunition, 
implementation and transparency mechanisms and the RIO clause. The content 
of the member states’ messages largely resembled the one delivered by the EU.76 
What is more, some EU member state delegations deliberately refrained from 
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“taking a national stance for the sake of investing into the European one”.77 For 
small EU member states with limited diplomatic resources endorsing the EU’s 
collective action in multilateral institutions indeed brings an added value for their 
national foreign policies. 
 Yet, several reservations about the degree of external cohesion have to be 
mentioned. First, despite widespread backing of the EU-oriented RIO clause in the 
text of the ATT, there was one country – the UK – which neither endorsed the RIO 
clause, nor aligned its statement with that of the EU. 78 Second, one specific 
difference in the positions of the member states was found in the statements of 
Germany and France. While the former explicitly rejected introducing exceptions 
to the Treaty's scope, like the one related to bilateral defence cooperation 
agreements promoted by India, the latter backed this provision on the basis of 
the right to self-defence.79  
 What factors can explain the external cohesion of EU actors in the ATT 
conferences? Certainly, the high degree of the inter-institutional coordination 
process and of the member states’ convergence of interests accounted for the 
relatively high level of external cohesion. The international legal context, on the 
other hand, provides some hints to understanding the UK’s and France's points of 
defection. As the permanent members of the Security Council, France and the UK 
sought to retain their room for maneuver during the negotiations despite the EU's 
common line. At the same time, they rarely provided the EU officials with insights 
discussed among the five permanent members of the SC.80 
The UK, generally speaking, holds a particular view on the CFSP and on the 
legitimacy of the EEAS diplomats to represent the EU externally. The EU-UK tensions 
over some aspects of European foreign policy were recognised during the ATT 
conferences as well. Recalling the UK’s standing behind the whole ATT initiative in 
2005, an EEAS official acknowledged that “the EU was important to be there as 
an actor, but it should not have stolen the scene of the main proponent of this 
initiative”. 81  France’s support of the exception to the ATT scope for bilateral 
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defence cooperation agreements lined up with India’s position.82 It appeared 
that France decided to share the main concern of the Indian delegation in order 
to secure a favourable trade deal on the sale of combat aircraft to India.83 
Overall, the UK and France remained cohesive with the other EU actors during the 
ATT negotiations and prioritised their national preferences over the collective EU 




This study investigated the EU’s involvement in the negotiations of the Arms 
Trade Treaty. The ATT is the first instrument adopted within the multilateral security 
settings of the UN aimed at putting the global trade in conventional arms under 
control. The paper showed that, from the very start of the initiative, the EU 
emerged as an active and committed player participating and presenting its 
view in all major stages of the negotiation process. The EU pursued two global 
objectives vis-à-vis the ATT. First, Brussels sought to ensure that the Treaty brings an 
added value for international security. In order to contribute to preventing 
international conflicts and violence worldwide, the new global instrument 
needed to be strong and progressive in terms of its substance. Second, the EU 
was also concerned about the form of the accord. EU policy-makers emphasised 
that the ATT should be as universal as possible in its membership in order to 
strengthen the multilateral global order. While the first objective was pursued by 
means of multilateral diplomacy within the UN fora, for the achievement of the 
second goal, the EU diversified its policy instruments to include bilateral 
diplomacy, CFSP actions for the global outreach campaign, and coalition 
building with relevant NGOs.   
 The central argument put forward in this paper is that overall the EU was an 
effective player during the multilateral negotiations on the ATT, but the degree of 
its effectiveness varies along different parameters. The EU scored relatively high in 
two out of three dimensions of effectiveness. First, the EU demonstrated an above 
average performance with regard to the achievement of goals. In line with its 
own conviction that only a strong and ambitious Treaty can have an impact on 
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global arms trade, the EU was able to shape the most important sections of the 
draft ATT related to scope, criteria, implementation and transparency. The only 
point, which was not achieved by the EU, was a reference to the right of regional 
organisations to become parties to the ATT. Second, the EU proved to be quite 
successful in projecting a single voice during the multilateral negotiations. With 
the exception of few instances, when France and the UK deviated from a 
common line, member states and EU institutions to a large extent acted in unison 
at the final UN conferences on the ATT. The high level of inter-institutional 
coordination and of the convergence of member states' interests significantly 
contributed to this outcome. 
On the other hand, with respect to the third dimension of the EU’s 
effectiveness – recognition of relevance – the EU’s performance was relatively 
weaker. Major heavyweights of global arms trade – Russia, China and India – did 
not endorse the ATT text during the final vote in the UNGA, despite the EU’s efforts 
in promoting universal membership of the Treaty. The international legal and 
political context proved to be the major constraining factor for the EU's ability to 
gain support from third actors in multilateral security fora. This mixed picture of the 
EU’s performance in the ATT negotiations allows suggesting an interesting 
conclusion: the fact that the EU acted as an effective actor in the multilateral 
security forum does not automatically imply the Union’s leadership role in the 
negotiating process.  
Given the results of this study, what are the implications of the EU’s 
involvement in the ATT process for a broader role of the EU as a foreign and 
security policy actor? There are at least three different dimensions of such policy 
implications. First, through effective support and promotion of the ATT, the EU 
strengthened its role as an international security provider. One of the long-term 
intentions behind the ATT initiative was to counter the spread of international 
conflicts, crime and other sorts of armed violence. Moreover, this relative success 
with the ATT could reinforce the EU’s posture in the much more strategic area of 
nuclear non-proliferation. As expressed by a French diplomat, “nuclear 
disarmament is inconceivable without parallel progress on disarmament 
regarding […] conventional arms.”84 
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Second, by way of pushing the ATT under the UN umbrella, the EU 
confirmed its commitment to a multilateral global order and showed to the 
outside world that effective multilateralism in the field of arms control and non-
proliferation is viable. This is especially important in the context of the negotiations 
on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which are currently blocked in the UN 
Conference on Disarmament. Third, but not least, an effective EU in the ATT 
process is good news for the EU’s image as a normative power: through the 
successful endorsement of export control criteria related to human rights, 
humanitarian law and gender-based violence, the EU reiterated once more the 
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